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PATENTABLE INVENTION
The most persistent and frequent question which one
practicing in that highly specialized branch of the law,
Patent Law, is called upon to answer is: "Does this device
involve a patentable invention?" Its answer is as elusive
as the well known eel, as subject to difference of opinion
as the prohibition question, and about as indefinable as a
state of mind; and all this in spite of multitudinous decis-
ions ranging from ex parte cases decided by Patent Office
tribunals to hotly contested inter partes cases decided by
the United States Supreme Court. It may therefore be of
interest to consider some of the fundamental concepts by
which one must be guided in giving an answer in any par-
ticular case.
The Constitution of the United States 1 provides for the.
granting of patents in the following words:
"The Congress shall have power . . . . to promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and in-
ventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
The Statutes 2 cover the matter in the following words:
"Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvements th6reof . . . may, upon payment of the fees-re-
quired by law, and other due proceedings had, obtain a patent therefor."
The Constitution and Statutes thus circumscribe the in-
ventions on which patents may be granted to those directed
to an art, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
to improvements thereon. Of these enumerated classes of
patentable invention, all but "art" are clear and definite.
With respect to "art" it has generally been held that the
1 ART. I, Sec. 8.
2 REVISED STATUTES O THE UNITED-STATES §4886.
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class of invention there referred to is one directed to a meth-
od or process of doing or making something, and is particu-
larly applicable to inventions involving chemical processes,'
and to new and improved methods involving a series of me-
chanical operations which are not the function of a machine
but which may be performed by a machine.4 A process
which is a mere function of a machine is not patentable,
however.5 The class "art" has also been held not to cover
discoveries in pure science, such as the discovery of physical
laws and scientific principles; 6 nor methods of doing busi-
ness;' nor code messages; 8 nor the arrangement of a room
in a house;9 nor printed matter or forms;'" nor a railway
tariff index;" nor a mathematical formula;' 2 nor the ar-
rangement of information on the leaves of a book."
The Constitution and Statutes require that the res, to be
patentable, must have been "invented" or "discovered," but
they do not define what a patentable invention or discovery
is, and Lhey fail to indicate criteria by means of which it can
be determined whether a new art, etc., involves invention.
It is therefore necessary to look to the common law and to
the textbooks for guidance, and these authorities we find to
be rather unsatisfactory when defining invention in general
terms, or to be restricted to determining the question of in-
vention in reference to the particular case decided. Thus in
Robinson on Patents ' we find the following exposition:
3 In re Weston, 1901 C. D. 290; In re Wagner, 105 0. G. 1783; Carnegie
Steel Co. v. Cambria Steel Co., 185 U. S. 403 (1901).
4 Expanded Metal Co. v. General Fireproofing Co., 214 U. S. 366 (1908);
Gulf Coal Co. v. Sutton, Steele & Steele, 35 Fed. (2d) 433 (1929).
5 Conroy v. Penn Electrical Co., 155 Fed. 421 (1907); San Jose Canning
Co. v. Oneal, 10 Fed. (2d) 100 (1926).
6 American Bell Telephone Co. v. Dolbear, 17 Fed. 604 (1883).
7 In re Talmadge, 174 0. G. 1219.
8 Bernardini v. Tocci, 200 Fed. 1022 (1912).
9 American Bed Co. v. Arnaelsteen, 182 Fed. 324 (1910).
10 In re Taylor, 136 0. G. 1767
11 Guthrie v. Curlett, 10 Fed. (2d) 725 (1926).
12 Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Satler, 21 Fed. (2d) 630 (1927).
13 Flint v. G. R. Leonard & Co., 27 Fed. (2d) 215 (1928).
14 Vol. 1, §§ 77, 78.
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"The inventive act in reality consists of two acts; one mental, the
conception of an idea; the other manual, the reduction of that idea to
practice .... The mental faculties employed in the inventive act are
the creative not the imitative faculties. An invention is the product of
original thought. It. involves the spontaneous conception of some idea
not previously present to the mind of the inventor. Industry in explor-
ing the discoveries and acquiring the ideas of others, wise judgment in
selecting and combining them, mechanical skill in applying them to
practical results; none of these are creation; none of these enter into
the inventive act."
The inability of anyone to define invention has even been
acknowledged by the Supreme Court when, in the case of
McClain v. Ortmayer,5 Justice Brown said:
"The truth is the word (invention) cannot be defined in such man-
ner as to afford any substantial aid in determining whether a particular
device involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not. In a given
case we may be able to say that there is present invention of a very
high order. In another we can see that there is lacking that impalpable
something which distinguishes invention from simple mechanical skill.
Courts, adopting fixed principles as a guide, have by a process of ex-.
clusion determined that certain variations in old devices do or do not
involve invention; but whether the variation relied upon in a particular
case is anything more than ordinary mechanical skill is a question
which cannot be answered by applying the test of any general defi-
nition."
Fortunately all of the courts have not spoken of invention
in the same mantner as Justice Brown did, and we are able
to find some decisions in which positive definitions of in-
vention are formulated. Thus in Eck v. Kutz, 6 the court
said:
"Inventive discovery . . . . involves the intelligent apprehension of
elements or operations not before recognized by others, although actual-
ly existing, followed by the conception of how they can be practically
utilized.
And in Ex parte Champney" it was said:
"Whenever in an art, machine, manufacture, or composition of mat-*
15 141 U. S. 427 (1891).
16 132 Fed. 758, 779 (1904).
17 1892 C. D. 176.
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ter a change, however apparently minute, is made which is not devious
and results in marked advantages, a patentable invention has been pro-
duced."
Many other interesting decisions-dommenting on invention
have been handed down by the courts, a few of which will
be quoted:
"The true test of invention is the novelty of the result, and that this
iesult must be criticised by. comparing it with the machines, processes
or methods known before. The test is an objective one. If the result of
an idea in a machine or process involving a new function, or an old
function arrived at by new means, the embodiment of the idea is
patentable." Is
"But patentable novelty in a case like the present may be founded
upon superior efficiency; upon superior durability including the ability
to retain a permanent form when exposed to the atmosphere; upon a
lesser tendency to breakage and loss; upon purity and, in connection
with other things, upon comparative cheapness." 19
"Invention is not always the offspring of genius; more frequently it
is the product of plain hard work; not infrequently it arises from acci-
dent or carelessness; occasionally it is a happy thought of an ordinary
mind; and there have been instances where it is the result of sheer
stupidity. It is with the inventive concept, the thing achieved, not with
the manner of its achievement or the quality of mind which gave it
birth, that the patent law concerns itself." 20
"Invention may reside in the conception of the idea for remedying
defects, and in the valuable results, even though the means for carry-
ing out the concept be simple and old." 21
"In every case involving the use of old elements in a new combi-
nation the ultimate questions whether invention or mere mechanical
skill was involved and whether the transfer of an old device to another
art is patentable, are questions of fact; where the substituted device
was not found in a closely analogous art, and the new association was
of benefit to the art, and utility is admitted by defendant's adoption
of it, the change is attributable to invention." 22
In other cases it has been held that invention was involved
in the thought of taking advantage of a known quality to
18 Hiler Audio Corp. v. General Radio Co., 26 Fed. (2d) 475 (1928).
19 Union Carbide Co. v. American Carbide Co., 181 Fed. 104 (1910).
20 Radiator Specialty Co. v. Buhot, 39 Fed. (2d) 373 (1930).
21 Matrix Contrast Co. v. Kellar, 34 Fed. (2d) 510 (1929).
22 Kendall v. Trico Products Co., 31 Fed. (2d) 522 (1929).
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accomplish a new result;23 in discovering the cause of a de-
fect;24 in making a slight improvement in a crowded art;2"
in changing a construction to obtain advantage in oper-
ation;26 and in using old principles to simplify a device.
In an interesting article in the Journal of the Patent
Office Society, 28 Horace G. Seitz, a patent attorney prac-
ticing in New York City, formulated the following defi-
nition of invention which he used in determining questions
of invention submitted to him:
"Invention consists fundamentally, in the isolation and solution of
problems. The presence of invention is made evident by the failure of
the prior art to present the complete solution of the totality of prob-
lems involved. The neasure of the invention is provided by the charac-
ter and extent of the problems and the manner of solution.
"Isolation of the problems is a prerequisite to the formulation of the
solution or solutions. If the art carries no suggestion of the problems,
it carries no solution, and the invention is of basic scope. If it carries
a partial solution, the missing problems must be isolated from those
solved by the known solution antecedent to development of a solution;
and, basically, such solution must deal with both the known and the
isolated problems in their relations one to the other, rather than in-
dividually.
"If the art fails to suggest any solution-even broadly-of the prob-
lems involved, the invention is of basic scope."
The result of considering the authorities on this question
is to impress upon the mind three factors which are para-
mount and largely determinative thereof. The first of these
is the novelty of the structure, of the steps of the process, or
of the elements and their relative proportions in the compo-
sition of matter involved in the res considered. In many
cases this novelty may be slight and Jnvolve but small
changes over the prior art, but it is an essential factor in
all cases except one, which will be later discussed. The sec-
23 In re Angert, 34 Fed. (2d) 1014 (1929).
24 In re Phair, 384 0. G. 477.
25 Rachlin v. Watsky, 30 Fed. (2d) 225 (1929).
26 D'Olier v. Tohlin, 363 0. G. 453.
27 Star Can Opener Co. v. Owen Dyneto Co., 16 Fed. (2d) 353 (1926).
28 Vol. 1, p. 381.
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ond factor is the manner in which the elements of the device
coact, or the relation or cooperation of the steps of the pro-
cess. This second factor is perhaps the most important one
because its answer is determinative in more cases than the
others, particularly in cases involving machines and pro-
cesses. The third factor is the result obtained by the new
res. In most cases these three factors must be considered
together, for the old saying that "there is nothing new under
the sun" is very appropriate to the question of invention
when interpreted to mean that in the natural course of
events one thing follows upon and is a mere expansion of
another already old. Thus it is generally true that any new
device is either a combination or aggregation of old parts
or devices, etc., and novelty of structure or res per se can
hardly be admitted. But if it is shown that a particular de-
vice involves a new arrangement of elements structurally
considered, and functions in a new way to produce a new
result, then it is seen that what at first blush appeared old
is in reality new, meritorious and unobvious, and hence in-
volves that "something" which marks invention. The func-
tion and method of functioning or co-operation of parts of a
device, if novel, thus generally indicate that the device in-
volves invention.
While the three factors set forth above may generally be
said to be determinative in any case, there are in addition
other rules, and particular applications of the above rules,
which the courts and Patent Office have laid down and ap-
plied in particular types of cases by means of which it may
be judged whether a device differing from prior devices in
certain respects, largely structural, involves invention when
compared to the prior art relating thereto. One of the most
common types of cases to which such rules are directed is
that in which the new device is the same, and comprises the
same elements as an old device, except for the addition or
subtraction of an element. In cases where the new device
comprises the mere addition of an element to an old com-
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bination, fhe new element functioning in the combination in
the same way that it functions in other uses and without
modifying the co-operative relative or function of the ele-
ments of the old combination, the device is considered to be
a mere extension of an old idea, and it has universally been
held that such a device does not involve invention.29 Thus
the addition to an old device of a locking mechanism to hold
parts in and out of operative position was held devoid of
invention;"0 the addition of a wedge to tighten a joint was
held not to involve invention;3 ' the use of an automatic
alarm on an engine-stopping device was denied patentabili-
ty;3 2 and the provision of additional holes in a rubber heel
lift for attaching purposes was held not to be inventive.3
However, in cases where the addition of an element in an old
combination produces a new cooperation of the elements of
the old device, or a different mode of action, with a new and
improved result, the device is considered to involve inven-
tion. Thus it was held that where a five-section scale for
measuring tracks involved more than merely adding a sec-
tion to a four-section scale, the other devices not being sat-
isfactory, the change amounted to invention. 4
Where a new device comprises an old device except for
the omission of an essential element thereof, such a device
is not patentable if the well known function of the omitted
element is also omitted; 35 but such a device involves invent-
ion if the remaining elements co-operate in a different way
or are re-arranged in a manner to produce the same result
29 Standard Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 126 Fed. 639 (1903);
Press Pub. Co., v. Westinghouse Machine Co., 135 Fed. 767 (1905); Volkman
v. Truax, 126 0. G. 2593.
30 U. S. Peg Wood Co. v. Sturtevant Co., 125 Fed. 378 (1903).
31 National Co. v. Interchangeable Co., 106 Fed. 693 (1901).
32 In re Addams, 111 0. .G. 1623.
33 In re Tufford, 315 0. G. 611.
34 Standard Scales Co. v. Fairbanks & Co., 125 Fed. 4 (1903).
35 In re McElroy, 161 0. G. 753.
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as the old combination. 6 It has often been said that to at-
tain simplicity is the highest trait of genius. In Davis v.
Perry,17 it was held that patentability may be based on sim-
plicity and elimination of parts when the prior art fails to
disclose the structure, in view of its utility and success,
though the invention is narrow; and in American School
Furniture Co. v.,J. M. Sander Co. et al.,3 8 that the omission
of an element from a combination, and the rearrangement
of what remains so as to perform the same function, amounts
to invention. But in the case of In re Thomson, 9 it was held
that where the omigsion of certain elements of a combination
merely involved the omission of their well known functions,
then only the judgment, selection and adaptation of old ma-
chines to particular work, which is expected of those trained
in the art, and not invention, was involved.
A second class of cases which is commonly met with is
that in which an old device is reconstructed to provide ad-
justability of parts thereof. Generally speaking, the courts
have held that merely to make a thing adjustable does not
fall in the range of invention, since any mechanic seeing
the desirability of such adjustability could provide it.4"
Among the numerous cases in which it has been so held are
Union Sewing Machine Co. v. American Raveller Co.,4
where it was held that mere adjustability of parts was not
sufficient grounds for the issuance of a patent; Wessel et al.
v. United Mattress Machine Co.,42 which held that where it
was old to provide for lateral expansion of a mattress stuffing
box and a spout therefor, it did not involve invention to pro-
36 Dececo Co. v. Gilchrist, 125 Fed. 293 (1903); Stevens Tool Co. v. Dav-
enport et al., 134 Fed. 869 (1905); Hardinge Bros. v. Marr Corp., 27 Fed. (2d)
779 (1928).
37 120 Fed. 941 (1903).
38 113 Fed. 576 (1902).
39 118 0. G. 266.
40 Smyth Mfg. Go. v. Sheridan et al., 149 Fed. 208 (1906); Houser et al
v. Starr, 203 Fed. 264 (1913); Minnesota Paper Co. v. Eibel Process Co., 274
Fed. 540 (1921); In re Scott, 37 Fed. (2d) 441 (1930).
41 119 Fed. 367 (1902).
42 139 Fed. 11 (1905).
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* vide for vertical adjustability in the same way; and Ross v.
Dowden Mfg. Co.," which held that where adjustability was
desired, it did not involve invention to provide it by means
of a series of holes in a supporting member which might be
engaged by a bolt of the part to be adjusted. In some cases,
however, adjustability has been found to be patentable
where it caused the machine to operate in a new way or to
perform a new function."' Among such cases it has been held
that invention was involved in making brackets for support-
ing swifts adjustable vertically and horizontally in view of
advantages secured; 43 that a new combination of elements
permitting a new adjustment and accomplishing a new and
useful result was patentable; 46 and that a machine for mak-
ing tire-forming material in which one part was adjustable,
so that an old device capable of but a single use was made
capable of universal use, was patentable.47
A third class of cases concerning which the question of
invention arises involves devices in which a number of parts
or elements, all old, are combined or aggregated, the use of
those parts in a device of the character considered being new.
This class of case is perhaps the most common of all those
to be considered, and involves the question of whether the
device is a true and patentable combination of elements or
a mere aggregation of elements which is not patentable. A
true combination of elements is one in which the elements
combined in the machine cooperate with each other to per-
form a new function in a new way, or where one element acts
upon another in the combination to change the mode of op-
eration of that other; in other words the parts coacting in
such a manner that their combined product or result is differ-
ent from that produced by the individual operation of the
same elements. On the other hand a device is a mere aggre-
4S 157 Fed. 681 (1907).
44 Rich v. Baldwin, 133 Fed. 920 (1904).
45 Atwood-Morrison Co. v. Sipp Electric Co., 136 Fed. 859 (1905).
40 Louden Co. v. Janesville Tool Co., 141 Fed. 975 (1905).
47 In re Morris, 386 0. G. 485.
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gation, and unpatentable, if the elements comprising it each
act independently of the others to produce an unrelated
series of operations or results such as might be accomplished
if each element was separate from the others. Some cases
held to involve a true combination are Steiner v. Schwartz,48
holding that where it was old to provide a doll with mechan-
ism whereby it could walk and also to provide a doll with
mechanism whereby it could sit, the bringing together of
these features and adding thereto means whereby the legs
were held rigidly perpendicular when walking involved
patentable invention; Oshkosh Matting Co. v. Waite Carpet
Co.,,9 in which two parts performed separate operations, but
the material operated upon coacted with these parts to con-
tribute to its movement through the machine from one part
to another, it was held that this coaction between the ma-
terial and parts negatived a claim of aggregation; Concrete
Appliances Co. v. Meinken,5 ° which held that apparatus for
elevating and distributing wet concrete to the floors of a
building under construction, which in a sense is a unitary
work, involved a patentable combination even though it in-
volved successive steps under manual control; and Line Ma-
terial Co. v. Brady Mfg. Co.,51 which held that a plate, clevis
and pin all cooperated to form a support for an insulator
permitting the insulator to move into the line of strain to
relieve wear, and the device therefore involved a true com-
bination. Cases in which a device has been held to be a mere
aggregation are Goodyear Co. v. Rubber Co., -2 in which it
was said that a combination of old elements each performing
its appropriate function in the same way was not inventive
even though the sum of all the old results made the article
more durable; In re Davenport,58 in which it was held that
48 148 Fed. 868 (1906).
49 207 Fed. 937 (1913).
50 262 Fed. 958 (1920).
51 7 Fed. (2d) 48 (1925).
52 116 Fed. 363 (1902).
53 110 0. G. 2017.
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an article consisting of a catalogue having a desk pad bound
thereto to form a cover was an aggregation of unrelated ele-
ments; In re Harris,54 which held that a method of prepar-
ing beverages consisting of the steps of preparing, storing
and dispensing the beverage was an aggregation; Campbell
v. Mangle,55 which held that taking the two best features
from the prior art and combining them into a single device
did not constituteo invention; In re Smith,56 which held that
merely bringing old devices into juxtaposition and there
allowing each to work out its own effect without a novel re-
sult was not patentable; and Muser v. Bell,57 which held that
merely making a more conveniently operating mechanism
than those preceding did not make an aggregation patent-
able.
A fourth class of cases concerning which the question of
invention must often be determined is one in which the new
device or subject matter involves a change in form, size, de-
gree or proportions as compared to previous subject matter
of the same character; in other words subject matter in
which the originator has merely carried forward an old idea
to produce a more efficient construction or one having ad-
vantages of refinement. These cases have seldom been held
to involve invention. Thus a change of size to adapt a de-
vice for use in another art, as from tile making to moulder's
core making was held unpatentable; 58 an article embodying
superior workmanship was held to be only an improvement
in degree and unpatentable;11 carrying forward an old idea
by changing the form of an element was held uninventive
even though a better result was obtained;6" mere strengthen-
ing of parts to obtain longer life was held unpatentable; 1
54 170 0. G. 484.
55 194 Fed. 110 (1912).
56 262 Fed. 717 (1920).
57 278 Fed. 904 (1921).
58 Brown v. Crane Co., 125 Fed. 34 (1903).
59 Edison v. American Mutoscope Co., 114 Fed. 926 (1902).
0 Galvin v. City of Grand Rapids, 115 Fed. 511 (1902).
61 Adams Co. v. S!cbreiber Mfg. Co., 111 Fed. 182 (1901).
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providing a greater degree of elasticity was held not to in-
volve invention; 2 a change in mechanical design without
accomplishing a new result was held unpatentable; 63 mak-
ing a device arc-shaped to avoid strain was held not to in-
volve invention; 64 a change in the form of a groove in which
a sealing mixture is placed was held unpatentable; 5 and en-
larging a clothes line pulley to make it effective for hauling
logs was held to be unpatentable.66 There are cases, how-
ever, in which a change of degree, etc., has resulted in the
production of a new result or a new function, and these cases
have been held to involve invention. This is particularly true
of chemical patents, where oftentimes a slight change of pro-
portion in the constituents of a formula produce an entirely
unexpected result or product. Thus an alloy of 7 per cent
tin, 20 per cent lead, and the remainder copper was held to
involve invention over an alloy comprising 8 per cent tin,
15 per cent lead, and the remainder copper, where the new
composition avoided eutetic alloys and the formation of a
homogenous mass; 67 and the use of a minute quantity, less
than 1 per cent, of oil to effect a change in the "type of oil-
ing" which produced results unaccounted for as a mere mat-
ter of degree, was held inventive.68 Other decisions have held
that lessening the weight of a part of a scale which converted
a machine from a failure to a success constituted invention; 69
that raising the breast roll end of a wire in a paper making
machine which increased the output of the machine from
450 to 600 feet per minute was new and inventive;"' and
that longitudinally corrugating a capillary tube to reduce its
cross section was invention where the corrugation effected
62 Waterman Co. v. Johnson, 123 Fed. 303 (1902).
63 In re Hill, 117 0. G. 2365.
64 Louden Machinery Co. v. Janesville Co., 141 Fed. 975 (1905).
6 In re Williams, 130 0. G. 1688.
66 Williamette Works v. Columbia Works, 252 Fed 594 (1918).
67 Ajax Metal Co. v. Brady Brass Co., 155 Fed. 409 (1907).
68 Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Miami Copper Co., 237 Fed. 607 (1916).
69 Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 208 Fed. 410 (1913).
70 Eibel Co. v. Minnesota Co., 267 Fed. 847 (1920).
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cross sectional reduction without disadvantages encountered.
in cross sectional reduction-by other methods.71
A fifth class of cases involves the change of location or
the reversal of parts of an old device. Devices differing from
the prior art in this manner are generally held devoid of in-
vention; but if they produce a new mode of action or a new
result they are held inventive. The test of invention in these
cases was set out in Mayer v. Mutschler72 to be that whether
it is patentable novelty to reposition the old parts of a well-
known machine depends on whether the result is new or
: merely an improvement, and whether the difference obtained
is one of kind or degree. Instances where cases of this kind
have been deemed uninventive are: In re Ivan, 3 involving
making a handle of a knife for cutting hay reversible on the
head of the shank to which the blade is attached; Redgrave
v. Singer,74 involving a change of location of a bagatelle
board handle from the end of a block to top and countersink-
ing it; Union Co. v. Domestic Co.,75 involving shifting the
platen of a typewriter toward and away from the type-bar
frame where the type-bar frame had previously been shifted
relative to the platen; In re Saunders,76 involving locating a
sales station at the rear of a self-serving store; Wappler
Electric Co. v. Bronx Hospital7 7 involving repositioning
parts to secure compactness without new function; and In re
Hammond,78 involving rotating a shaft with respect to a
fixed dial instead of rotating a dial relative to a fixed shaft.
Instances in which invention has been held to be involved. in
such changes are: Tompkins Co. v. Holden,79 involving re-
positioning a roll in a paper-making machine to prevent
71 Schlaich v. Robertson, 26 Fed. (2d) 681 (1928).
72 248 Fed. 911 (1918).
73 95 0. G. 441.
74 120 Fed. 306 (1902).
75 109 Fed. 85 (1901).
76 383 0. G. 813.
77 28 Fed. (2d) 419 (1928).
78 326 0. G. 684.
79 273 Fed. 424 (1921).
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breakage and increase production; Hoffman Co. v. Las-
ance, involving admitting steam through a perforated
hinged presser plate rather than through perforations in a
bed plate where the change produced new and useful re-
sults; and Diamond Co. v. Brown,"' where a substantial and
patentable difference was found between means for pressing
a saw in a straight line to stationary material, and lifting
material of great weight and bulk to a saw.
A sixth class of cases which often arise involve substitut-
ing one material for another in an old device. These cases
as a rule do not involve invention, but there are exceptions
to the rule, and under some conditions the use of certain
materials alone, or in combination with others, to produce
desired results, may involve invention, even though it in-
volves merely taking advantage of inherent qualities de-
veloped or discovered experimentally. 2 Obviously a change
of materials which involves invention often occurs in chemi-
cal mixtures and metal alloys. Instances where a change of
material has been held to involve invention are: Allen Filter
* Co. v. Star Co.,83 where a refrigerating coil was made of re-
silient material rather than metal to avoid breakage of the
coils; Dickelman Mfg. Co. v. Lorcher,84 where use Was made
of a thin sheet metal for the outer wall of a chicken brooder
to utilize the extra radiating power of such material over
wood, the improvement being revolutionary and contrary
to conventional conceptions; Ludlum Steel Co. v. Terry,85
where a valve was made of an alloy, previously known, where
use of the alloy accomplished a hitherto unattained result;
Thomson-Houston Co. v. Lorain Steel Co.,8" where one ma-
terial when substituted for another successfully overcame
80 202 Fed. 923 (1913).
81 130 Fed. 896 (1904).
82 Supra note 67.
83 40 Fed. (2d) 252 (1930).
84 4 Pat. Q. 190 (1930).
85 37 Fed. (2d) 153 (1928).
80 117 Fed. 249 (1902).
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an obstacle which a number of workers in the field had un-
successfully attempted to overcome; and George Frost Co.
v. Cohn,7 where the substitution of one material for another
was in a relation in which the substituted material had
never before been used, and which accomplished new and
beneficial results long sought for by those in the art. In-
stances where substitution of material was denied invention
are: Angier v. Nehring Electrical Works,88 where a package
for an automobile tire was formed by a wrapping of crepe
where the use of burlap and plain paper was old; Cahill v.
New Orleans Public Service,8" where a steel sealing ring
in an electric meter was substituted for a felt ring, to prevent
tampering with the recording mechanism; and Health Prod-
ucts Co. v. Ex-Lax Co.,," where phenolthalein was substi-
tuted for non-bitter cascara as a laxative in chewing gum.
A seventh type of cases involves the changing of the parts
of an old device to divide previously combined or unitary
parts, or to make integral, parts previously separate. The
case is rare where the bare idea of consolidating several
members into one has been held to involve invention; 9 and
any new function or effect, where making a thing in one
piece that was before made in two, does not give it patent-
ability unless there is evidence of "unexpected properties or
uses capable of producing a new result." 02 Particular cases
involving such changes which have been held devoid of in-
vention are: making a broom cap of one flaring piece
fastened on one side instead of two pieces fastened on two
sides; 93 using three castings bolted together instead of one;
making a device in one piece instead of several, and thus
87 119 Fed. 505 (1902).
88 37 Fed. (2d) 953 (1930).
89 35 Fed. (2d) 534 (1929).
90 24 Fed. (2d) 245 (1926).
91 Herzog v. Keller Co., 234 Fed. 85 (1916).
92 Cordley v. Richardson Corp., 278 Fed. 683. (1921).
93 Lay v. Indianapolis Brush Co., 120 Fed. 831 (1903).
94 Stetson v. Herreshoff Mfg. Co., 113 Fed. 952 (1902).
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cheaper and more durable, but in an expected manner natur-
ally anticipated by the elimination of joints;9" building
solid what was formerly soldered together;"' and combining
unit molds into multiple molds, even though necessary to
commercial success, was denied invention.97 Particular cases
involving such changes which have been held patentable
are: making teeth supporting ribs integral rather than
riveted, where so doing shortened the teeth, reduced break-
age, and permitting a larger proportion of the teeth to be
used;9 8 and in making the supporting arm of a bracket for
a shade roller and the ears for a guide roller of one integral
piece.99 The last case cited was decided in view of a doc-
trine announced in the much discussed case of Davis-Bour-
nonville Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co.,100 in which it was
said that it is not a rule of general application that there
can be no invention in making into two parts what was
single, and vice versa, and it is often an invention of consid-
erable merit to combine into one what everyone theretofore
thought must be two. The instances which the Davis v. Mil-
burn case states may involve invention are, of course, those
which have the "unexpected properties," etc., set forth
above.
An eighth class of cases concerning which the question of
invention often arises is one in which an old device or pro-
cess is employed in a double or analogous use. This is the
only class of case in which novelty of construction of the
res is not involved. In such cases the manner in which the-
device operates in its new use, that is, the proximate func-
tion of its actuating mechanism, must be considered; and if
similar in the new device to that of the old device, it is un-
patentable. Thus under this rule a device for simultaneously
95 General Electric Co. v. Yost Co., 139 Fed. 568 (1905).
96 Lawson v. Metal Products Co., 209 Fed. 51 (1913).
97 I. T. S. Rubber Co. v. Panther Co., 253 Fed. 63 (1918).
98 Vanderhoef v. Johnson, 233 0. G. 1403.
• fl In re Daniel, 34 Fed. (2d) 995 (1929).
300 297 Fed. 846 (1924).
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operating a plurality of tuning elements in a radio apparatus
was held to be anticipated and unpatentable in view of a
device for operating a churn or a printing press. 0 1 In an-
other recent case involving the question whether the art of
stopping leaks in automobile radiators was analogous to and
unpatentable over the art of stopping leaks in tires, the
court held that the problems arising from difference in place
and structure of the leaking article and the means and meth-
ods of solving said problems had to be considered and com-
pared, and that when so considered the art of stopping
radiator leaks was patentable over the art of stopping tire
leaks.'112 The problems solved and the method of their so-
lution by devices employed in different arts, must therefore
determine the patentability of one device over another in a
different art. Illustrations of unpatentable analogous arts
are: a machine for finishing concrete pavements was held
anticipated by a machine comprising the same combination
of elements and used in a turret lathe; 0 3 a seal against back
pressure used in a metallurgical liquid fuel furnace was held
anticipated by a seal used in liquid fuel furnaces general-
ly; 1°1,a disc plow was held to anticipate a disc cultivator,
plowing and cultivating being analogous arts;. 5 and weav-
ing a fabric from reed strands in a way familiar in weaving
other fabrics was held not inventive." 6 Illustrations of
similar devices in non-analogous arts, and therefore patent-
able, are: a frozen confection on a stick was held inventive
over a lollipop and over a block of ice frozen to a metal
handle; 0 7 a rotary drier for paper making machines was
held non-analogous to steam turbines and refrigerating ap-
101 In re Asbury, 5 Pat. Q. 120 (1930).
102 Radiator Specialty Co. v. Buhot, 39 Fed. (2d) 373 (1930).
103 In re Robb, 5 Pat. Q. 484 (1930).
104 In re Meinkoff, 3 Pat. Q. 306 (1929).
105 Linville v. Milberger, 34 Fed. (2d) 386 '(1929).
106 In re Lloyd, 30 Fed. (2d) 1006 (1929).
107 Popsicle Corp. v. Weiss, 40 Fed. (2d) 301 (1930).
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paratus;1 8 and applying a principle employed in a waffle
iron to an electric toaster was held inventive." 9 It is often
quite difficult to reconcile the decisions involving double or
analogous use, some admitting and others denying invention,
since apparently the same factors leading to a decision in
one case are lightly held in another; but, considered general-
ly, the trend seems to be to show more liberality in favor of
invention at the present time than formerly.
A ninth class of cases concerning which the question of
invention arises is one in which a new device involves a
multiplication or duplication of features old in the art to
which the device relates. Such a mere duplication of parts is
not patentable."0 Instances in which invention has been de-
nied in cases of this character are: placing a tab on the bot-
tom and top edges of an index card, where a tab had been
previously applied only at the top edge;"'. making two
vertical rows of retorts empty into a common standpipe
where it was known that a series of retorts could be emptied
into a common standpipe; 112 and duplicating the inidi-
rectional entrance of a sales section to allow two lines of
customers to enter at one time instead of one line as prev-
iously." 3 There have been a few cases where such changes
have been held patentable, however. Thus it has been held
that duplication amounted to invention where it produced
a new unitary additional result, and not duplication of prod-
uct or function;" 4 and that provision of two cranes with a
boring machine to enable new work to be hoisted to po-
sition simultaneously with the removal of the completed
piece, where only one crane was shown by the prior art, was
patentable." 5 The test of patentability in cases of this type
108 Berry v. Robertson, 40 Fed. (2d) 915 (1930).
109 Economy Appliance Co. v. Fitzgerald Co., 35 Fed. (2d) 756 (1928).
110 Burnham et al. v. Union Mfg. Co., 110 Fed. 765 (1901).
11 Library Bureau v. Macey Co., 148 Fed. 380 (1906).
112 Riter-Conley Co. v. Atlanta Gaslight Co., 234 Fed. 896 (1916).
113 In re Saunders, 383 0. G. 813.
114 Goss Printing Press Co. v. Scott, 108 Fed. 253 (1901).
115 In re Sears, 148 0. G. 279.
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is substantially the same as that applied to determine the
question of true combinations as opposed to aggregations,
and requires that some new, different and unexpected result
follow from the duplication of old elements.
Devices which comprise a combination of elements in
which all the elements are old in a prior device except for
one or more elements which are substituted for elements in
the old combinations, present a tenth type of cases concern-
ing which the question of invention is frequently raised. The
general rule applied to this class of cases is that the substi-
tution of a new element for an old element in a combination
does not make the combination patentable where the new
element is differently constructed, but performs the same
function as the substituted element, and the new combin-
ation functions in the same manner to produce the same re-
sult as the old combination. The leading case on this sub-
ject is In re McNeil,"6 decided by the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia, and involved a sewing machine in
which a particular type of stitch-former was employed; one
claim of the application reading:
"In a sewing machine, the combination with stitch-forming mech-
anism, including devices for forming two rows of irregular stitches, the
adjacent loops of which are interlocked, of a trimmer arranged in ad-
vance in the stitch-forming mechanism and in the line of the same,
substantially as described."
The Court denied patentability in the following words:-
"Borton and Wilcox having invented the combination of a trimmer
with a stitch-forming mechanism, it is not invention to combine a trim-
mer with another stitch-forming mechanism whether the stitch-forming
mechanism be new or old. No new result is accomplished by appellant
which differs in kind from the result accomplished by Borton and Will-
cox. There is no special coaction between the particular stitch-forming
mechanism and the trimmer. Each acts in its own way and is not
affected by the other and performs its function in the combination ir-
respective of the other. I think that what the appellant has done is
within the province of a mechanic and does not amount to invention."
116 1902 C. D. 563.
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The same rule applies whether the new element added to
the old combination be new per se or not; and if it is new
per se it must be claimed separately and apart from the old
combination. Combinations which have been held to involve
the mere substitution of equivalents are: the substitution of
a leather washer for a metal washer in a tool-retaining coup-
ling;117 the substitution of a tractor drive for a steam or
gasoline engine in a stump pulling machine; 1 8 the substitu-
tion of a caterpillar tractor for horses as a motive power for
a snow plow; "' the substitution of a better strainer for a
metal wool strainer in an oil purifying device; 20 the sub-
stitution of electrical solenoids for rotating cams in a valve-
operating device;"'2 and the substitution of a cutting stylus
for a pressure stylus in a record-forming device.' 22 Instances
in which a change in the construction of an old device or
combination by changing an element thereof have been held
patentable and not merely the substitution of an equivalent
are: the substitution of a belt-drive for an overrunning
clutch in a self-starter for automobiles;' the substitution
of an air lift pump for a sucker-rod pump in a combination
for fusing sulphur underground and raising it to the sur-
face;124 the substitution of a solid arm with fixed end centers
for a slotted bar or free link involving an apparently simple
change, where the change involved a reorganization of the
elements functioning in an improved manner;12 the substi-
tution of one form of clutch for another for locking the ad-
justing screw of a micrometer gauge to lock the spindle se-
curely without disturbing its minute adjustment;"'2 the sub-
117 In re Stevens, 36 Fed. (2d) 296 (1929).
118 Huston Mfg. Co. v. Clyde Iron Co., 32 Fed. (2d) 558 (1929).
119 Northern Trailer Co. v. La Plant, 21 Fed. (2d) 686 (1927).
120 In re Sweetland, 12 Fed. (2d) 163 (1926).
121 In. re Bowers, 321 0. G. 215.
122 In re Hawley, 117 0. G. 2364.
123 In re Huff, 259 0. G. 386.
124 Union Sulphur Co. v. Freeport Texas Co., 251 Fed. 634 (1918).
125 Troy Carriage Co. v. Kinsey Co., 247 Fed. 672 (1917).
12 6 Brown & Sharpe Co. v. Starrett Co., 225 Fed. 993 (1912).
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stitution of a chambered block or valve for two poppet valves
in a mechanism for playing musical instruments where this
one light valve was easily workable by suction and quickly
responsive in light motors;117 and substituting a split-phase
alternating current for two or more independently generated
currents. 28
In addition to the rules relating to the different types of
cases in which the new device bears somewhat of a struc-
tural relationship to the prior art, there are certain auxiliary
rules or criteria of invention which may be determinative and
applicable in cases where there is doubt of the existence of
invention as measured by the foregoing rules. These rules
or criteria, considered alone, are not decisive in any case,
but have often been held important in deciding close ques-
tions, as where the novelty of the device in question was
slight and of doubtful invention.
One of these auxiliary rules is that where the question of
invention is doubtful the fact that the device is of superior
utility, or that it is the first to successfully perform a useful
function, may be sufficient to turn the scale in favor of in-
vention and the validity of a patent therefor. 129 In Imperial
Bottle Cap Co. v. Crown Cork Co. 13o it was said that where
there is an actual and admitted improvement in a combin-
ation of old elements, and its utility is shown in a marked
degree, there should be controlling reasons to rebut the pre-
sumption that there is a sufficiency of invention to support
a patent. And in Burdon Wire Co. v. Williams,131 it was
said that while the utility of a device cannot prove that it is
a patentable invention, it is entitled to weight when the
question is doubtful. A particular instance wherein utility is
largely determinative in favor of invention is where 'the
127 Aeolian Co. v. Piano Co., 134 Fed. 872 (1905).
128 Westinghouse Mfg. Co. v. Roberts, 125 Fed. 6 (1903).
129 Sperry Mfg. Co. v. Owens Co., 111 Fed. 388 (1901).
180 139 Fed. 312 (1905).
181 128 Fed. 927 (1904).
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change in the new device over old devices is small, but is
the thing which gives the device utility or makes it oper-
ative." 2
The fact that there existed a mechanical requirement for
a machine to do a certain thing for a long time, which was
first supplied by an inventor with a given machine, is another
factor which has often been held to evidence invention in
that machine.13 Thus in Todd Protectograph Co. v. Safe-
Guard Check Writer Co.,' it was held that the history of
the art is a safer test of the exercise of the inventive facul-
ties than is mere speculation, a priori, as to what new steps
are within the imagination of the ordinary journeyman; and
if, after numerous efforts, a need of long standing is suc-
cessfully met, it is a mistake to suppose that the answer was
all along apparent. In Blake Automotive Co. v. Cross Mfg.
Co.,"3 5 it was held that a device which has gone into exten-
sive use and met great favor with the public is not anticipat-
ed by a patent disclosing a different construction and which
had been in existence for thirteen years, during which time
the best device was diligently sought. And in Brogdex Co.
v. American Fruit Growers,"6 it was held that evidence that
a remedy to prevent blue mold decay in fresh fruits was
sought for twenty-five years prior to the discovery of the
patentee, was proof of invention, although "viewed retro-
spectively and ignoring the long unsuccessful search for a
remedy, the claimed process would seem to be wanting in
invention." The case last cited is now under consideration
by the Supreme Court, and it will be of interest to note
whether the decision quoted favoring invention is affirmed;
the patent being based on very slight novelty but being of
a scope dominating the entire citrus fruit industry. The de-
132 Atlantic & Pacific Co. v. Wood, 288 Fed. 148 (1923).
133 Maunula v. Sunell, 155 Fed. 535 (1907).
134 291 Fed. 613 (1923).
135 13 Fed. (2d) 30 (1926).
136 35 Fed. (2d) 106 (1929).
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cision of the Supreme Court in this case will probably have
an important bearing upon the consideration to be given
evidence of satisfaction of a long felt want in determining
the question of invention.
Somewhat akin to evidence of satisfaction of a long felt
want as evidence of invention is evidence that others had
sought and failed to produce a device to accomplish a cer-
tain purpose." 7 Thus it was held in Hale & Kilburn Co. v.
Oneonta Ry. Co.'3" that where many have struggled for
years to accomplish a result without avail, it combats the
contention that there is no invention. Other cases holding
to the same effect are Hallock v. Davidson "I and American
Fruit Growers Co. v. Brogdex Co. 4 '
The commercial success with which a new device has met
has sometimes been held to evidence invention in cases of
doubt. 4' Thus it was held that the conjunction of true me-
chanical combination, novelty, great utility and notable com-
mercial success in a very ancient art is persuasive that more
than mechanical skill is involved in a device.'42 In Ferry v.
Waring Hat Co.'43 it was held that where a patented de-
vice proved exceptionally successful commercially, produced
a marked saving in the cost of manufacture and in the
amount of waste, and resulted in an enlarged output, it in-
volved invention even though the improvement seemed triv-
ial. Again it was held that extensive use of a device, not
merely due to advertising, and the fact that defendants
themselves abandoned a previously used device and adopted
the patented one, evidenced invention.'44 The factor of imi-
137 Hanifen v. Armitage, 117 Fed. 845 (1902).
138 124 Fed. 514 (1903).
3 107 Fed. 482 (1901).
140 35 Fed. (2d) 106 (1929).
141 Boyer v. Keller Tool Co., 127 Fed. 130 (1903); In re Thomson, 118
0. G. 266; Kohler v. Smith, 326 0. G. 895; Crozier-Straub v. Reiter, 34 Fed.
(2d) 577 (1929).
142 Regent Mfg. Co. v. Penn Electrical Co., 121 Fed. 80 (1902).
143 129 Fed. 389 (1900).
144 Peters v. Union Biscuit Co., 120 Fed. 679 (1903).
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tation or universal adoption by competitors is strong evi-
dence of patentable invention." 5
In another important line of cases it has been held that a
simple device or improvement may involve patentable in-
vention where it converts failure into success or accomplishes
what others tried to accomplish and failed.' The very sim-
plicity of the device thus sometimes becomes the factor de-
terminative of invention on the ground that the simplicity
illustrates the elusiveness of the solution to others previous-
ly engaged in an attempt to solve the problem.'47 Other
cases have held that small changes in a new device over the
prior art by which the new device remedies former defects
and supplies a need; 4 or results in a saving of time, ma-
terial and the use of skilled labor to produce a better and
cheaper article;14 or where it is favorably received and
recognized by the art and there is a great demand for it;'5
are inventive. And in Star Brass Works v. General Electric
Co. 5' it was held that the change involved in a new device
"seems simple enough now but it was the first to combine
comprehension of the problem to be solved with a practical
arrangement of parts for its solution." The same thought
that simplicity of solution of a problem after disclosure does
not negative invention, where. the solution was long sought
by the art, has often been expressed by the courts and will
easily be recognized as equitable and correct.
"The invention all admired; and each how he
To be the inventor missed, so easy it seemed,
Once found, which yet unfound most would have thought
Impossiblel" -Milton.
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